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have been purposely confined to the results of actual adjudications. They contain but an outline of telegraph law, which
future decisions will doubtless amplify and complete.
T. W. D.'

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Judicial Court of New Hfampshire.
OPINION THAT THE SOLDIERS' VOTING BILL HAS BECOME A VALID
AND BINDING STATUTE OF THE STATE.
When the governor returns a bill to the legislature, and his messenger notifies
them that it is a message from the governor, the provision of the constitution in
reference to bills becoming law unless returned within a certain number of days,
is complied with, and the legislature cannot prevent its effect by refusing to
receive the message.
The constitution gives a certain number of days, of twenty-four hours each,
and the governor's veto would still be in time if delivered to the speaker on the
last day, though after the adjournment of the house.
The adjournment contemplated by the constitution in such provision is a final
adjournment for the session. Therefore, an intermediate recess or adjournment
for a few days, while the bill is in the governor's hands, does not affect the time
within which he should return it. And should the proper house not be in session on the last day, the governor may return the bill to the speaker, clerk, or
other proper officer.
The presentation of the bill on a certain day at the governor's usual place of
receiving bills, is a presentation to the governor on that day, within the meaning of the constitution, though lie may not receive personal notice of the presentation until after the expiration of that day. But the governor may, by special appointment and notice to the legislature, make some other place the proper
one for such presentation.
By the Statutes of New Hampshire, of 1842, the day an act is done is tobe
excluded in computing time from an act, though previously the law was otherwise. How far the computation of time under the section of the constitution
giving the governor five days to return a bill, can be affected by the statute
passed subsequently: Quere.

To the .HonorableSenate and House of Representatives:

By the resolution of the two houses of the legislature,. passed
on the thirty-first day of August, 1864, and communicated to us
by the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House, on
the 14th day of September instant, in connection with extracts
from the journals and other evidence upon the subject, the opin-
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ion of the court is requested upon the question .whether or not
the Soldiers' Voting Bill, passed by the legislature during the
special session, in August last, has become a law without .the approval of the governor.
The bill referred to, as we understand it, is the bill entitled
"A
An act to enable the qualified voters of this state, engaged in
the military service of the country, to vote for electors of President and Vice-President of the United States, and for representatives in Congress."
. So far as the journals of the two houses are concerned, it has
been decided in the opinion of the judges, 35 N. H. Rep. 579,
that they are to be treated as authentic records of the proceedr
ings of the two houses, and are to be taken by us as conolusivq
proof of the facts there recorded as having taken place. But
of course no opinion upon questions of fact, of either house or
of any committee or member thereof, expressed in any vote or
resolution, and recorded in said journals, can be competent aq
evidence upon any subject.
In connection with said journals there is presented also muc4
other evidence upon various points. But our impression is, tha.
it was not contemplated by article 74 of our constitution, which
authorizes each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor
and council, to require the opinion of the justices of the Supreme
Court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions, that the judges should be called upon to' settle questionq
of fact in any form. We shall not, therefore, undertake to decide any matter of fact, or weigh the evidence 'with any view of
settling disputed questions, the decision of which depends upou
evidence alone.
But the president of the Senate and speaker of the House, i4
presenting the case to us, seem to assume that certain facts aro
established and proved, and they are assumed by them as the
facts .in the case. Now we propose, without giving any opinion j
in relation to the existence or non-existence of such facts, to
take substantially what we understand to be assumed as the facts
by your presiding officers-such at least as we deem most material-and upon those, as upon a " case stated," to give our opinion upon such questions of law as seem to be material.
We understand the most material of the facts, thus assumed
to be established, to be the following :-" That said bill origi
nated in the House of Representatives, passed both branches of
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the legislature, was duly engrossed, signed by the presiding
officers of both branches, and about noon on Wednesday, August
17th, 1864, was carried by the assistant clerk of the Senate to the
executive chamber, in the state house, in accordance with the
customary mode of presenting bills to the governor, and was laid
upon the table of the governor, who was then absent from the
room, but who had been there during the morning, and was expected to return that afternoon, but did not; that when said bill
was thus laid upon the governor's table, some members of the
Executive Council were present, and also Mr. Barrett, the state
auditor, who was the son-in-law of the governor, and who had a
table there in the executive chamber for the transaction of his
business, near that of the governor; that the assistant clerk of
the Senate, when he entered the executive chamber with said bill,
announced that he had a bill for the governor; that the governor
saw said bill on Thursday, August 18th, when he 'came into the
executive chamber, and found it upon his table there; that both
houses adjourned from Saturday, the 20th, to Tuesday, the 23di
of August, and were not in session on Monday, August 22d;
that on Wednesday, August 24th, in the afternoon, the governor
sent a message to*the House of Representatives by Mr. Sinclair,
a member of said house, who gave notice to the speaker, in the
house, when in session, that he had a message from the governor
to present; that the speaker declined to receive it from him;
that said message was not received by any action of the speaker
or of the house, and was not read in their hearing, but that, near
the close of the session that afternoon, while the yeas and nays
were being taken on a motion to adjourn, which was decided in
the affirmative, the secretary of state laid said message on the
speaker's table, stating it to be a message from his excellency,
the governor; that this message was not opened or read in the
house, but was afterwards, on a subsequent day, referred to a
select committee; and that in this message of the governor he
stated his objections to the bill in question, and returned said bill
therewith to the house."
Upon this statement of facts thus presented to us, four questions of law may arise:1. Whether what occurred' on the afternoon of August 24th
is to be regarded as a return of the bill to the house by the
governor, with his objections, within the meaning of the constitution ?
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2. Is Monday, August 22d, to be counted as one of the five
days specified in the constitution ?
3. When was said bill presented to the governor?
4. How shall the five days specified be computed?
The provision of the constitution bearing upon these questions
is as follows:
ARTICLE 44. "cEvery bill which shall have passed both houses
of the General Court, shall, before it bebomes a law, be presented
to the governor. If he apptove, he shall sign it; but if not, he
shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which itshall
have originated. * * * * If any bill shall not be iketurned by
the governor within five days (Sitndays excepted) after it shall
have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the legislature, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law."
I. Upon the first question raised, there can be no doubt. The
act of the secretary of state, in laying said message upon the
speaker's table, and announcing it as a message from the governor,
before the house finally adjourned, was a sufficient return of the
bill. We are also of opinion that the governor might send this
message by any officer or member of the house, or other proper
person, and if properly announced, as in this case it 'was, we see
no reason why that would not be sufficient. If the governor
returns the bill to the house in which it originated, and the house
is properly notified that it is a message from the governor, neither
the house nor the speaker can prevent its effect by refusing to
receive it. The duty of the governor is performed when, he
returns the bill, with his objections, to the house in which the
bill originated, and gives them proper notice, whether it is received
or not.
Nor are we by any means prepared to say that the legislative
day was ended, necessarily, by the adjournment of the house,
even though it might have been at the usual hour in the afternoon; or that the return of the bill at any convenient time
during the day to the speaker, although after the house had
adjourned for the day, would not have been sufficient.
The provision of the constitution in relation to this subject
sfiould receive a reasonable construction, and it can hardly be
supposed that the time limited for the return of the bill has
expired because that branch of the legislature in which the bill
originated has adjourned for the day, if the five days limited by
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the constitution have not expired.

The word ,day," in its com-

mon acceptation, means a civil day, of twenty-four hours, beginning and ending at midnight: Shaw vs. Dodge, 5 N. H. Rep.
465; Colby vs. KnaNp, 13 N. H. Rep. 175. The governor's
veto message was therefore properly returned to the House of
Representatives, on Wednesday, August 24th. Was that in season to prevent the bill from becoming a law? This will depend
upon the other questions to be considered.
IL Is Monday, August 22d, when neither house was in ses."
sion, to be counted as one of the five days specified? Upon this
point there can be no doubt. The adjournment referred to in
this provision of the constitution is not, we think, the ordinary
recess or adjournment from time to time during the continuance
of the session, but the final adjournment at the clbse of the session. In fact, this is the only adjournment, we think, which
could prevent a return of the bill within the time limited. If
we are right in the views expressed upon the first point, viz.,
that it might be sufficient for the governor to return the bill, &c.,
to the speaker after the adjournment of the house for that day,
if within the five days, then it follows, of course, that the house
could not prevent the return of a bill by adjourning over any oneof the five days, even though it should be the last one of the five,
because the bill might in that case be returned within the time
limited to the speaker, or to the clerk, or some other proper
officer. But when a final adjournment of the legislature for the
session occurs before the expiration of the five days, then the
bill cannot be returned, nor could the two houses act upon it if
it could be then returned. In the case before us it is clear, we
think, that the return was not prevented by the adjournment in
question any more than it might have been by the adjournment
from day to day. The time for consideration, on the part of the
governor, which was the great object of this provision, was not
interfered with, but was all the more at his command and free
from interruption and care on that account.
The constitution provides, in articles 19 and 86, against any
.adjournment of the House or Senate during the session for more
than two days at any one time. It could not have been expected
that any such adjournment would or could operate to defeat the
return of any bill within the time there specified, that the governor
might wish to veto. Although, in the case before us, both houses
adjourned for the same time, yet it often happens, and may at
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any time happen, that one house will adjourn for a day or two,
while the other is in session. Now a bill must be returned to
the house in which it originated, and if it should be held that it
must be returned to that house while in session, then an adjournment of that house over one day would prevent the return of the
bill during that day as much as an adjournmont of both houses;
and if it had been intended to provide against such aii adjournment for a day, or two days at the longest, the constitutional
provision should have been that the'bill should be returned in
five days to the house in which it originated, unless that house
shall prevent it by an adjournment. But no such provision was
made. The only adjournment that was to prevent the return of
the bill, was an adjournment of the legislature; that is, of " both
houses of the General Court," and not of either house alone. The
language used would seem to be sufficiently indicative of the
intention of the framers of the constitution in this matter. Their
opinion was, most evidently, that an adjournment of either house
for a time not exceeding two days, whether the other house adjourned for the same time or not, was not to prevent such return
of any bill;*but that it was only the final adjournment of the.
legislature, of both houses, for the session that could have had

that effect. We concur with them in that opinion.
Monday, August 22d, is therefore to be reckoned .as one of
the five days specified.
III. When was this bill presented to the governor? If there
can be no presentation of a bill to him until it is put into his own
hand, then it was not presented until Thursday, August 18th.
But it would be absurd to hold that the officers of the Senate and
House of Representatives are obliged, in order to perform their
duty, to follow the governor wherever he may chance to go, whether in the state or out of it, upon his private business as well as
public, and present bills to him in person, wherever he may haappen to be. Some states provide a dwelling-house, which is located,%at the capital and owned by the state, in which the governor, for
the time being, is required by law to reside. But in our state
we have no executive mansion of that kind. The governor here
is not required to reside, or even to board in Concord. He might
have neither residence, boarding-place, house, office, or stoppingplace at the capital, except at the state house; or he nay reside
in Concord and spend all his time there. He may have a store,
office, or other place of business. He may be engaged in differ-
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ent kinds of business at several different places in Concord, or
out of Concord, and have as many diff'cnt offices for the transNow it is perfectly apparert that,
action of such business.
under these circumstances, in order that the business of legislation may be conducted with sufficient order and the necessary
dispatch, there should be some place where it can be understood
that communications can be made to the governor, and where it
shall be his duty to attend, either in person or by some private
secretary, or agent, authorized to receive bills, papers, and communications for him in his absence, at least during the sessions
of the legislature; and we know of no more appropriate place,
during the sessions, for the presentation of bills and making
other communications to the governor, than in the executive
chamber, where it may be understood that such presentations
may be made at reasonable hours, and where they will be received
and attended to, and where it may be expected that the governor
'will attend, in person or otherwise, at such proper times, as to
see that the public interests do not suffer, and that all the duties
imposed upon him by his high office may be seasonably perf rmed.
Still this is not necessarily the place where the governor
receives communications from the two houses; that must depend
upon the usage. If it had been customary, both for the two
houses to make these communications there, and for the governor
to receive them there; if they both understood that this was the
proper place where such communications were to be made and
received, then the assent of both would be implied, and if such
was the usage, and it was continued down to the time of the presentation of the bill in question, then it would be the duty of the
governor to attend at such chamber and receive such communications, or to have some one there for that purpose, and the depositing of a bill there in the usual place by an officer of one of

the houses, and calling the attention of the governor, secretary,
or other person in charge of the room, to the fact, would, we
think, be a good presentation, although in consequence of the
temporary absence of the governor for a few hours, or his attention being directed to other things, he may not have seen or
known of such presentation on the day it was made.
This usage, though of long continuance, might probaLly be
changed by the governor, and he might make, by special appointment, and a notice thereof to both houses, a private apartment
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in his own house; or at a hotel, or some other room in the statb
house, or in any other building, if within proper distance, and in
other respects reasonably convenient, the place for receiving such
communications, and then such apartment would be the proper
place for making such presentations, and would so continue until
otherwise ordered. But when he has thus changed the place and
established a new one for this purpose, and such commuilications
are habitually made there, his temporary absence for ab hour, or
for an afternoon, ought not to affect the presentation, and W6
think that in law it could not.
Cases might arise where, by reason of sicl-ness, the governor
was obliged to be absent from the ordinary place of presentation
altogether, or was unable from other causes to attend during th6
whole or a part of a session. What should be done in such cases;
or what would constitute such a vacancy as would authorize th6
president of the Senate to assume the governor's chair, we need
not now inquire, as none of these questions are raised by th
case before us.
But in case -here by a settled usage, iinderstood and assented
to by all parties, the Chamber of the Governor and Council wag
the place for making such communications,'and so continued
down to the time of the presentation in question, and the governoi
continued to attend there for that purpose, on the same day, and
the day following, we think a presentation there would be sufficient, although by reason of his temporary absence, or other
cause, it failed to come into his hands, or to his knowledge even,
until the day after such presentation.
Upon the facts thus presented to us in this case, we think thd
bill in question was presented to the governor, within the mieaning of the constitution, on Wednesday, August 17.
IV. Upon this view of the case it might become unnecessary
to consider the remaining question, as to the computation of
time; because if the bill was presented to the governor on Wednesday, August 17th, then the five days (besides Sunday) within
which the bill must be returned, would expire with Tuesday, the
23d, by any mode of computation known to us. The bill was
returned to the House on Wednesday, the 24th, with the veto
message, and was, in any event, one day too late. We will,
however, briefly allude to this fourth question. is the day on
which the bill was presented to the governor to be included or
excluded in computing the five days? Under the provisions of
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our present statute, there is no doubt that the day of presentation should be excluded : Revised Statutes, ch. 1, sec. 25. But
this provision was introduced into our statutes at the revision in
1842, and prior to that there was no similar provision. But before this statute a very different rule of computation had prevailed in this state, and in other states and countries, which was
probably the true rule when the constitution was adopted. It
was ea;ly.settled to be the law of this state, that in the computation of time from a date, or from the day of a date, the day of
the date is to be excluded. But that where a computation is to
be made from an act done, or from the time of an act, the day in
which the act is done is to be included: Scoville vs. S'imes, 3 N..
H. 16 ; Priestvs. Tarleton, 8 N. H. 93 ; Band vs. Band, 4 N.
H. 267; Blake vs. Crowninshield, 9 N. H. 204. In the case
before us the time is to be computed from an act done, or the
time of an act. The act is the presentation of the bill, and from
that act the time is to be computed. Before the Revised Statutes, the day on which the act was done, must have been included
in computing the five days within which the bill must be
returned.
Now, according to that computation, the bill was not returned
in season, even though it had not been presented to the governor
until Thursday, August 18th, because, including the day of presentation, we should have Thursday, Friday, Saturday, Monday,
Tuesday, within which the bill must have been returned, but was
not. If we were to adopt that computation, the bill would have
become a law before it was returned, whether we hold the presentation to have been on Wednesday or Thursday.
There is no doubt that this construction would have been given
to this provision of the constitution, prior to the Revised Statuteg, and would now be given to it, but for the section alluded
to, which was added at the revision and which, beyond question,
changed the rifle of computation in cases like the present. This
statute provision may properly operate, and must operate in the
construction of other statutes; but the question arises, how far
can it affect the constitution ? The coastitution was before this
statute, and was and is above it, and paramount to it in authority,
and cannot certainly be changed in its letter or form by the provisions of any statute. How far its construction can or should
be affected by any change in the statute; whether by the enacting of any statute, the constitution can be made to mean what it
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did not mean before, in a case like this, is a question which we
need not now determine, as it is not necessary in order to decide
the case -before us.
We, therefore, without undertaking to pass upon, or to give
any opinion concerning any question of fact raised by the evidence, but endeavoring to ascertain and decide such questions of
law as we suppose to be material, and which were suggested by
the communication riade to us, certify -our opinion to the honorable Senate and House of Representatives, that upon the facts
assumed to have been established in the communication made to
us, and thus presented to us by your direction and in your behalf,"
the bill entitled "An Act to enable the qualified voters of this
state engaged in the military service of the country, to vote for
electors of President and Vice-President of the United States,
and for Representatives in Congress," having passed both Houses
of the General Court, and been presented to the governor, and
not having been returned by the governor, with his objections,
to the House in which it originated, within five days (Sundays
excepted) after it was presented to him, and such return of said

bill, within said five days, not having been prevented by the
legislature by their adjournment, has become a law in like manner as if the governor had signed it, and that the same is now a
valid and binding statute of this state.
September 23d, 1864.
J. E. SARGENT.

A. BELLOWS,
GEO. W. NEsmITH.

HENRY

The undersigned, justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, wish
to have it understood that they do not regard it as any part of
their official duty in a case like this, to find from evidence submitted to them, the facts which are to be the foundation of their
opinion. But, upon the facts assumed in the foregoing opinion,

they agree in the conclusion that the act in question has become
a valid law.
IRA PERLEY,
WILLIAm H. BARTLETT.

My opinion is that said bill has become and is a law.
CHA LES Do.
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I. Some interesting questions have
arisen as to the rower of courts generally to inquire into the acts of otlhe
branches of the government, and especially into the facts of the passage of
laws by the requisite majority of the
legislature. These will be found discussed in the note to The People ex rel.
Keyes vs. The Auditor, &c., 3 Am. Law
ieg. N. S. 332. The court in the principal case have shown some anxiety to
be properly understood in regard to undertaking to examine into any questions of fact preliminary to the case
upon which they were to decide. There
is no doubt, however, that the courts
have been in the habit of treating the
journals of the legislature as proper to
be consulted by them, and as being
conclusive evidence upon all questions
of legislative action therein recorded:
See the opinion of the same court, 35
N. H. 679 ; the note to People vs. The
Auditor, above cited; and also the syllabus of People vs. Secretary of State,
3 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 314.
II. A very important topic, that is
somewhat discussed in the foregoing
case, is the mode of computing time.
The question usually occurs where, in
the computation of time from the date
of an instrument, or the day of the date,
or from an act done, or the day it was
done, it becomes necessary to determine
whether the day of the date or the day the
act was done, is to be excluded or included.
It was held, at an early day, that
there was a distinction between those
cases in which reference was had to the
date, and where it was to the day of the
date, so that while in the former the
day was included in computing time, in
the latter it was excluded. Lord CoKE,
however, in his commentary on Littleton (46 b), takes the ground that the
expressions are synonymous, and that
in both cases the day is to be excluded;

a position which Lord MANSFIELD, in a

later case, says recent decisions have
denied to be correct, and so far from
there being any uniform rule on the
subject, each case must stand )n its
own particular merits, and a rigid adherence to any rule would necessarily
work injusti-e. This is the conclusion
he comes to after a most careful examination of all the authorities, with a
view to elicit some general rule; and
if unsatisfactory as far as certainty is
concerned, is probably the most likely
to effectuate the intention of parties:
Pugh vs. Duke of Leeds, 2 Cowper 714.
Where the computation is to be made
from an act done, it was said in Glassington vs. Rawlins, 3 East 407, that
the practice was consistent and uniform to include the day on which the
act was done, and The King vs. Adderly,
2 Douglass 463, and Castle vs. Burditt,
3 Term 623, were cited as sustaining
the position.
But in Lester vs. Garland, 15 Vesey
248, not only was the question considered unsettled as far as regards autherity, but it was moreover said that the
practice of including the day an act
was done in computing time therefrom,
was contrary to reason; that thcre was
no tangible distinction between the
cases in which the computation was
from the date, where the day of the date
was generally excluded, and from an
act done, where it was contended the
day should be included; that it was
preferable to exclude the day in every
case, and was more in accordance with
the maxim of law that fractions of a
day are disregarded; and the act and
day being coextensive, the act cannot
properly be said to be done until the
whole day is passed.
It was, however, admitted that due
weight ought to be given to the .subjectmatter, and the particular circuniz anees
should decide in all instances. An ad-
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mission, the propriety of which met the
entire approbation of Chief Justice
DENMAN in Wilkinson vs. Gaston, 9 Ad.
& E. N. S. 141.
In The King vs. Justices of Cumberland, 4 Nev. & Man. 378, where the
case turned upon the question, as to
the sufficiency of a notice, required by
Act of Parliament, on account of the
number of days; it was held to be the
practice under statutes, and in accordance with court rules, to exclude in the
computation of time the day a notice is
given, but to include the day on which
the thing is to be done for which notice
is required.
Upon a review of the English cases,
it may possibly be said, to be the present tendency of the courts to exclude
the day, both where the computation isto be made from the date or day of date,
and from an act done.
On this side of the Atlantic the question appears to be involved in equal
uncertainty, and although in the principal case it is said to have been settled
law in New Hampshire, before the Statute of 1842, that the day an act is
done is to be included in computing
time therefrom, yet in other states there
are many cases in which a contrary
doctrine is asserted.
Thus in Bigelow vs. Wilson, reported
in I Pick. 485, Chief Justice Wn-r.,
adverting to the practice ofincluding the
day an act is done, says "it is against
reason, and opposed to the principle
that fractions of a day are disregarded
in law; besides, in some cases it would
induce an absurdity; for suppose one
day allowed a debtor to redeem after
an act done, and the act done on the
last moment of the day, the right of
redemption would be defeated by construction." Moreover, the exclusion
of the day is in accordance with the
custom in the case of bills of exchange,
where the day of acceptance is always
excluded in computing time. The pro-

priety of excluding the day an act is
done, in conformity to the law merchant, was also alluded to in Lester vs.
Garland, cited above.
Judge WASHINGTON, in Pierpont vs.

Graham, says: "I understand the rule
to be, where reference is made to the
date of an instrument, that if a present
interest-passes, the day is included in
computing time; but if it is used merely
to fix a terminus a guo, it is in all cases
excluded, and with regard to the day an
act is done, the weight of authorities
is in favor of inclusion:" 4 Wash. C.
C. 232.
This is the rule laid down in Arnold
vs. United States, 9 Cranch 104, and in
Kentucky, in Chiles vs. Smith's Heirsm,
13 B. Mon. 461. The Court says in this
case, if the computation had been from
the day the act was done, a different
rule would have prevailed.
In Pennsylvania, it was held in Lisle
vs. Williams, 15 S.& R. 135, that the
day a bond was dated was included in
computing time, but the case was somewhat shaken by the comment of Ch. J.
GmnsoN in Taylor vs. Jacoby, 2 Barr 497.

The rule of including the day whs
adopted in New Hampshire in cases
cited in the principal case, and in Indiana in Jacobs vs. Graham, 1 Blbck'ford 392. On the other hand the doctrine of Bigelow vs. Wilson is followed
in Connecticut: Weeks vs. Hull, 19
Conn. 376, and Sands vs. Lyon, 16 Id.
18; Maine: Windsor vs. China, 4 Greenleaf 298; New York: Cornell vs. Moulton, 3 Denio 12. In Wilcox vs. Wood,
9 Wend. 346, SAvAGE, C. J., says:
"Where reference is had to the day of
date for computing time. I know of no
decision in this state settling the point."
And he permitted evidence to be given
of a custom in Albany, that where, in
leases, the words from the date were
used, it was intended from 12 o'clock
noon of the day of date.
Where the question has arisen under
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rules of court or statutes giving a certain number of days, there has been
rather more uniformity of decision
among the states, with regard to the
day from which computation should be
made.
Thus, in Ex parte Dean, 2 Cowen 605,
it was held that under statutes the universal rule was to exclude the day an
act was done: See, also, Col. Turnpike
Co. vs. Haywood, 10 Wend. 422; Phelan vs. Douglas, 11 How. Pr. Rep. 193.
This is the case in Kentucky: Sanders
vs. Norton, 4 Mon. 464; Maine: Flint
vs. Sawyer, 30 Maine 226; Massachusetts: Presbury vs. Williams, 15 Mass.
193; Illinois: Ewing vs. Bailey, 4
Scam. 420; and New Hampshire: Rand
vs. Rand, 4 New Hamp. 267. This was
early established as the law of Pennsylvania: Sims vs. Hampton, 1 S. & R.
411; Browne vs. Browne, 3 Id. 496;
6
reen's Appeal, 6 W. & S. 327; Goswiler's Estate, 3 Pa. Rep. 200; and may
still be considered as the rule, though
in Thomas vs. Afflick, 4 Harris 14, the
Supreme Court said that Goswiler's
Estate "was not well considered," and
included the first day, as they did also
in Barber vs. Chandler, 5 H. 48, though
in the latter case they quote Goswiler's
Estate as still authority. So also in
Com. vs. Maxwell, 3 Casey 455, the
court obiter quote Thomas vs. Afflick as
ruling that the first day is to be inIn Marys vs. Anderson, 2
cluded.
Grant 446, however, and especially in
Cromelien vs. Brink, 5 Casey 522,
where the question is more thoroughly
examined than in any of the other
cases, the court may be considered to
have overruled Thomas vs. Afflick;
and the last case on the subject, Marks's
Ex'rs. vs. Russell, 4 Wright 372, ap-

The foregoing examination, though
it has failed to discover any uniform
rule in the number of cases referred to,
may fairly be said to have established
the following as a result.
1. That from the date and from the
day of the date mean the same, and are
to be construed accordingly as they
may best effectuate the presumed intention of the parties who employed them,
but in the absence of particular circumstances they are to be taken to exclude
the day of date; and the circumstances
which most frequently induce courts to
construe them otherwise, are when an
estoppel may be avoided or a forfeiture
saved.
2. With regard to the day an act is
done, that it is most agreeable to reason
to exclude it, and tends to produce uniformity in the law (as being in accordance with the law merchant), which,
in the absence of paramount considerations to the contrary, should govern.
3. That under statutes and rules of
court, the current of authorities runs
strongly in favor of excluding the day
on which an act is done, an event happens, or of a date referred to, in the
computation of time therefrom.

III. The court in the principal case
notice a very important point in constitutional law, though they do not
find it necessary to make any decision
upon it, as to how far the construction
of the constitution which would have
been held at the time of the.making of
that instrument, may be affected by a
subsequent statute. This is a point
which has not been much discussed in
the courts, and upon which, therefore,
we do not desire to venture any suggestions. A strong argument for one
side of the question will be found in
the opinion of the Supreme Court of
pears to settle the rule on the basis of
Pennsylvania in the case of Commonthe older decisions. In Indiana, how3 Casey 459.
ever, the day the act was done is in- wealth vs. Maxwell,
J. T. M.
cluded in the computation: Evans vs.
Darlington, 5 Blackf. 267.
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iSupreme Court of Calfornia.
CARPENTER V8. ATHERTON.
1. The "specific contract law" of the state of California is valid and does not
conflict with the Act of Congress of July 11, 1862, making Treasury notes lawful
money and a legal tender in the payment of private debts.
2. It was held competent for the legislature to. provide that judgment for the
plaintiff shall be payable in the kind of money or currency specified in the contract or obligation on which it was rendered, and that execution shall follow the
judgment in this particular.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CuRR.Y, J.-The defendant made and delivered to the plaintiff his contract in writing, bearing date the 2d of April, 1864,
by which, for a yaluable consideration, he promised to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of five hundred dollars on demand, in United
States gold coin. Some time afterwards the plaintiff duly demanded payment of the sum of money due on this contract, in
the kind of currency specified therein. The defendant refused
to pay in gold coin, but subsequently, and before this action was
commenced, tendered and offered to pay to the plaintiff certain
United States notes, amounting in the aggregate to the sum of
the principal and interest due the plaintiff. The United States
notes so tendered were issued under and in pursuance of the Act
of Congress of the United States entitled "An Act to authorize
an additional issue of United States notes, and for other purposes," approved July 11, 1862. By this act the notes so tendered were made lawful money and a legal tender in the payment
of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except
as therein otherwise provided.
The defendant, by his answer, pleaded the tender of these
United States notes for the payment of the amount due, 'and
brought the same into court with his answer, ready to be paid to
the plaintiff.
The plaintiff demurred to the answer on the ground that it did:
not state facts sufficient to constitute a defence, specifying as
causes of demurrer:
1st. That the United States notes tendered are not money,
and the plaintiff was not nor is by law obliged to receive the same
in payment of the sum of money due him.
2d. That by the contract on which the action was brought the:
VOL. XIIL-15
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defendant promised to pay the sum of money due plaintiff in gold
coin of the United States, and the defendant does not aver a
tender of the amount due in such coin.
The demurrer was sustained, and at the same time leave was
granted to the defendant to amend his answer, which he declined
to do, whereupon the court ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff have and recover against the defendant the principal and
interest due, and the costs of the action, specifying the amount
thereof, payable in gold coin of the United States; and it was
further ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff have execution to
force the collection of such judgment, with the interest which
might accrue thereon, and that such execution specify, direct,
and provide that the judgment and all accruing interest thereon
"shall be collectable only in gold coin of the United States."
The defendant has appealed from this judgment, which brings
up the case to be considered upon certain alreged errors, that are
assigned in a well-drawn bill of exceptions, presenting the whole
case upon its real merits.
The exceptions taken to the rulings and judgment of the court
raise the question as to the validity of the Act of the Legisla-ture of this state passed on the 27th of April, 1863, commonly
called the " Specific Contract Law," in so far as its provisions
relate to the points involved in this controversy: Laws of 1863,
p. 687.
The second section of this act provides that, "In an action
*on a contract or obligation in writing, for the direct payment of
money, made, payable in a specified kind of money or currency,
judgment for the plaintiff, whether the same be by default or
after verdict, may follow the contract or obligation, and be made
payable in the kind of money or currency specified therein."
The third section of the act provides that the execution to be
issued on such judgment shall state the kind of money or currency in which the judgment is payable, and shall require the
sheriff to satisfy the same in the kind of money or currency in
which it is made payable, and that the sheriff shall refuse payment in any other kind of money or currency; and in case of
.levy and sale of the property of the judgment-debtor, he shall
refuse payment from any purchaser at such sale, in any other
,kind of money or currency than that specified in the execution.
It is a cardinal rule in the construction of statutes that every
.reasonable intendment is to be made in support of their validity:
-
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Morris vs. The People, 8 Denio 381; Ex parte McOollom, 1
Cow. 564; Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch 87; People vs. Stupervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y. Rep. 241. But whenever it is clear
that the legislature has transcended its powers, in the passage of
an act which is repugnant to paramount law, it is among the
most important duties of the judicial authority to declare the
invalidity of the act so passed: Adams vs. Howe, 14 Mass. 345;
*Fletchervs. Peck, 6 Cranch 87.
By the laws of the land, the country is furnished with three
kinds of money-gold, silver, and United States notes-as a
medium of exchanges. Money, made by the coinage of gold or
silver, is a legal tendet' as prescribed by law, in the discharge of
obligations, which are to be satisfied by the payment of money,
in general terms; and we have held in Lick vs. Faulkner,and in
other cases, that the notes of the United States, issued by the
authority of the laws of the National Legislature, are a -lawful'
and authorized currency, and in that sense lawful money and
a legal tender in the payment of private debts; but it does not
follow that every kind or any kind of money which by law is a
legal tender in the payment of debts may be tendered in satisfaction of every obligation capable of performance by the transfer
and delivery of property in satisfaction of it.
In Lick vs. Faulkner we said, upon good authority, that gold
and silver are commodities, the value of which is estimated by
the value of other things, in the same manner as that of the latter is estimated by the value of gold and silver. This quality "or
characteristic of the precious metals is not destroyed by their,
division into parcels bearing the impress of the Mint and possessing a specific value, ascertaihed and regulated by positive law.
If one agrees generally to pay or deliver to another a given number of dollars, he may perform his contract by the payment of
the specified sum in any kind of dollars which are recognised as
such and made a legal tender for the purpose by the law of the
land; for by doing so he fulfils his engagement according to its
letter; but if he contracts, for a valuable consideration, to pay
his debt in a particular kind of money, his obligation cannot be
discharged in accordance with his stipulation by payment in a
different kind of money; and though by the unaided rules of the
common law he could not be compelled to perform specifically
that which he had promised, yet, in morals, his obligation to do.so is in no degree diminished.
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Courts of equity from an early period have exercised jurisdiction, enforcing the specific performance of contracts, for the reason that the courts of common law, though recognising the obligation of the parties to a contract to perform their respective
parts of it according to its terms, could not afford this remedy to
the party injured by the non-performance of the other. At law
the party disappointed by the breach of the contract was compelled to be satisfied with money, as a substitute for the thing
for which he had contracted, and to which he was in justice
entitled.
The money recovered in such cases, by way of damages, was
considered as a substantial equivalent for the injury sustained by
the breach of the contract. But upon this subject Judge STORY
says: " It is against conscience that a'party should have a right
of election whether he will perform his covenant or only pay
damages for the breach of it :" Story on Eq. Jur. 717 a.
Contracts relating to real property embrace by far the most
numerous instances in which the jurisdiction of a court of equity
may be invoked to administer the remedy of specific performance.
But this species of remedy has not been limited to the enforcement in terms of agreements relating *to lands. It has been in
many instances extended to enforcing specifically contracts relating
to personal property, and also to the performance of personal
acts, though in such cases peculiar circumstances must exist to
call forth the remedial agency of the court. The reason assigned
for the universal exercise of this jurisdiction as to contracts
respecting lands and not in relation to agreements concerning
personal property is not because of any distinction between realty
and personalty, but because in the former case damages at law
cannot be regarded as a complete and adequate remedy for the
breach of the contract, while in the latter a compensation in
damages is deemed commensurate with the injury sustained. But
whenever a violation of a contract relating to personal property
cannot be correctly estimated in damages, or whenever, from the
nature of the contract, a specific execution of it is indispensable
to justice, a court of equity will not refuse its aid: Duff vs.
Fi8her, 15 Cal. 381; Willard's Eq. Jur. 271, 280; Fells vs.
Reed, 3 Vesey 70; Sullivan vs. Tuck, 1 Maryl. Ch. Decisions
59; Waters vs. Howard, Id. 112; Barr vs. Lapsley, 1 Wheat.
152; Phillips vs. Berger, 2 Barb. 608, and 8 Barb. 528,; &uy-
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vesant vs. I7e Mayor of New York, 11 Paige 414, 427; Story's
Eq. Jur., sections 712 to 720.
The man who contracts to sell and convey lands is under no

greater obligation, morally, to perform his agreement than he
who agrees for a valuable consideration received to deliver to the
purchaser personal property which he has sold is to perform his.
If there be any distinction between the two cases, let the learned
casuist resolve it, for if on this point we are in error we neea to
be instructed.
The act of the legislature by authority of which the judgment
in this case was rendered is remedial in its nature, affording to
the party who may be justly entitled to the performance of the
contract in terms the means of enforcing it. The right to its
enforcement is consistent with good faith, and with the dictates
of a scrupulous and exact justice. Then, is the legislature competent to provide for the creditor a remedy to compel his debtor
to do what he has solemnly and deliberately bound himself to
do? On this point there can be.no doub.t, unless the act under
consideration is in derogation of the laws of Congress making
United States notes lawful- money and a legal tender in the payment of debts. Upon the solution of this question our judgment
must necessarily depend.
Before a court, duly appreciating the measure of its duty, will
declare an act of the legislature invalid, as contravening the laws
of Congress, a case must be presented in which there can be no
rational doubt (z parte McCollom, 1 Cow. 564); for it is not on
slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to
be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts to be
considered void: Retcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch 87.
It is insisted on the part of the appellant that, as the Acts of
Congress making United States notes lawful money and a legal
tender in the payment of private debts il the paramount law,
therefore such currency is adequate for the discharge of all debts
which are to be satisfied by the payment of money. This is so,
as we have already observed, in respect to debts that are-payable
in money generally; but as to the contract, which is the foundation of the judgment in this case, it is more than a contract for
the payment of money merely. It goes to the extent of defining
by what specific act the contract shall be performed. By the
admitted and settled rules of law, such a contract can be per-

formed, according to the agreement of the parties, only by the
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payment of the kind of money specified. Is there anything in
law or morals opposed to such a contract ? If not, what objection can there be to enforcing it in case its voluntary performance
is refused ? That a creditor may have uses for money of a particular kind, the Acts of Congress making United States notes
lawful money and a legal tender in the payment of debts seem to
have contemplated. He may have to pay duties on imports and
debts beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
and for these uses these Government notes are not a lbgal tender. Necessities of the kind suggested exist in commercial communities, where United States notes are the usual media of
exchanges, as verified by every day's experience. The importer
of merchandise must have gold and silver money to pay the duties
imposed by law on his importations. With such means only can
he discharge his pecuniary obligations to the Government. He
must have metallic money for the purchase of such merchandise,
because the paper currency of the Government will not answer
his purpose abroad. The importation of goods from foreign
countries is a lawful trade, which Congress, under the Constitution, may regulate and has from time to time regulated. By
what means is the merchant, who is engaged in this species of
trade, to provide for his necessities-that is, for the payment of
his debts abroad and his duties on imports at home-unless by
securing payment from his debtors in the kind of money which
he needs and without which he must abandon the business in
which he is engaged? Perhaps it will be answered that he must
sell his goods for ready money, and not upon a credit, and thus
secure a price in gold and silver; and the purchaser from him
must in his turn also sell for like .ready money in order to be
furnished with the means to pay the importer; and the consumer
must also provide himself with the same kind of money, let it be
derived from what source of industry it may, to pay for the
goods he may need for consumption.
If the owner of property may sell the same for metallic money,
to be paid concurrently with the sale and delivery of it, we can
see no reason why he cannot sell for the same kind of money to
be paid at a future day. A sale on credit is, by the customs and
laws of trade, recognised as legitimate, and is deemed to be consistent with good conscience and sound morals.
It is sometimes argued that the act of the legislature under
consideration discriminates invidiously, to the discrediting of

CARPENTER vs. ATHERTON.

United States notes. We are unable to perceive wherein. There
is certainly nothing in the act itself that can justify any such
inference. If such a charge were made against the Act of Congress making United States notes lawful money and a legal tender in the payment of certain debts, it might be maintained with
more seeming plausibility. Congress itself has limited the uses
to which the notes can be applied, and has provided expressly
that in certain cases gold and silver money shall be used within
the United States for the discharge of pecuniary obligations, and
thus, by implication, at least, has recognised an existing necessity
for the employment of gold and silver money for the excepted
uses. But even in this we cannot perceive that any unjust discrimination is made between the different kinds of money. With
the people of some countries trade can be carried on by the use
of silver money with greater convenience and advantage than
with gold coin ; yet it cannot be said that the merchant who" furnishes himself with silver for his purposes thereby discriminates
to the prejudice of gold. The argument that the act in question
unjustly distinguishes between metallic and paper money, if valid
.as an objection to contracts for the direct payment of a particular kind of money, upon a credit given, is equally so as to sales
made for the same kind of money, paid at the time. It would
be illogical to hold that the effect in the one case is more or less
detrimental to the credit of United States notes than in the other.
Arguments of the character which we have here noticed are too
obviously fallacious to require even the attention which we have
devoted to their refutation.
Again. The man of means, actuated by patriotic motives to
aid the Government, or for the purpose of legitimate investment,
may desire to accumulate United States notes, with the view of
exchanging them for bonds of the Government payable within
the time and bearing the rate of interest specified and provided
in the Act of Congress. Is there, or can there be, any good
reason why he may not provide for the desired supply by securing payment from his debtors in the kind of money that would
serve his purpose? Is not the end which he seeks lawful, and
are not the means legitimate to the end ?
The Acts of Congress relating to the National currency, comprehending all kinds of money, and the various provisions of
those acts, must be considered and construed in pari materia.
By this course it will be readily and at once perceived that while
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United States notes are by the sovereign behest made lawful
money and a legal tender in the payment of debts, except in the
instances specified, gold and silver money is equally, by force of
positive law, a legal tender in the payment of all debts, and is
also recognised as an indispensable currency for purposes to
which Government notes cannot be applied; and therefore the
inference is logical, if not inevitable, that Congress did not design
that these acts should interfere to prevent men from contracting
for any particular kind of money which they might need.
Whatever, in the estimation of men engaged in monetary
transactions, may be the difference in value between gold and
silver money and the paper currency of the Government of the
same denominations, we cannot say judicially that a gold or silver dollar is of greater or less value than a United States note
of the same denomination, and we doubt if a case could be presented to a court of justice which would authorize evidence of a
difference in the value of the two kinds of money. A court
would be placed in an anomalous and absurd predicament in listening and giving heed to evidence designed to establish as a fact
that one dollar is worth more or less than another: Woods vs.
Bullens, 6 Allen's R. 516.
By an Act of the Congress of the United States, passed in
1853, silver money, consisting of half dollars, quarter dollars,
dimes, and half dimes, issued in accordance with the standard of
that act, was made a legal tender in the payment of debts, in
sums not exceeding five dollars. Now, if A. should loan to B.
one thousand half dollars, coined under the Act of 1853, and B.
should in consideration thereof contract with A. to pay the debt
so created in like silver coin, would not a tender of the same kind
of money in payment of the debt be a legal tender? No one,
we apprehend, who understands the import of the word tender,
would answer otherwise than in the affirmative. Then, if the
debtor in such case could discharge his obligation by a voluntary
performance of his promise, on what just principle could he
escape it if he were so determined ? The duties of the obligor
and obligee in such cases must be reciprocal, and they should be
commensurable. In the nature of things, that which it is lawful
to tender, under the contract supposed, on the one hand, it is
lawful to demand on the other: 8 Barb. 528; 1 Sim. & Stu. 174
and 607; 2 Edw. Ch. R. 531; Story's Eq. Jur. sec. 723.
The act of the legislature under consideration is purely reme-
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dial in its nature. It creates no new right in the abstract. It
does no more than add to the cases in which it is competent for
the courts to enforce the execution of contracts specifically, and
provides the means by which this can be done. In this, the act
is in harmony with the doctrines of equity jurisprudence relating
to kindred subjects, and at the same time it in no just sense contravenes the laws of Congress making United States notes lawful money and a legal tender in the payment of debts.
It is alleged, on the part of the appellant, that the court erred
in determining by judgment that the costs and disbursements of
the action must also be paid in gold coin.
The second section of the act provides that judgment for the
laintiff may follow the contract or obligation and be made payable in the kind of money or currency specified therein. The
plaintiff was entitled to recover his costs, which became a component part of the judgment and payable in the kind of money
specified therein.
I
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RHODES, J., SHAFTER, J.
1. The Act of Congress of the 25th of
February, 1862 (U. S. Stat. at Large,
1862, ch. 32), provides that the Treasury notes therein authorized to be issued (commonly called Greenbacks),
"shall be lawful money and a legal
tender in payment of all debts, public
and private, within the United States,
except duties on imports and interest
as aforesaid," that is, interest on United
States securities.
The constitutional power of Congress
to pass this law, that is, to issue Treasury notes, and invest them, when issued, with the properties and attributes
of money, and to make them a legal
tender in the payment of debts, including not only those due from the Governrent'to individuals, but those also due
from one individual to another, has
been considered and determined in the
highest courts of several of the states.
The validity of this act in this respect
was sustained by the Court of Appeals

of the state of New. York in the cases
(which were considered together) of
The Metropolitan Bank vs. Van Dyck,
Superintendent of the Bank Department, and Meyer vs. Roosevelt, 13 E.
P. Smith (not yet published).
A m!ajorlty of the court were of the
opinion that the issue of such notes was
a legitimate and appropriate means of
carrying into execution the specific and
express power, to borrow money on the
credit of the United States.
The judgments of Justices EmOTT and
Wax. B. WRIGHT rest upon substantially
this basis; and are masterly exhibi-tions of research, learning, and compact judicial logic and reasoning.
The validity of the act has also been.
expressly upheld by the Supreme Court
of the state of Iowa, in the very recent
case of Hintrager vs. Bates, December
Term, 1864 (17 Iowa Rep.-not yet
published), as it impliecdly was in the
previous cases of Warnebold vs. Schlict-
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ing and Troutman vs. Gowing, reported
16 Iowa Reports. The last case was
substantially like Meyer vs. Roosevelt,
supra, except that the note was payable in gold, and it was held that the
creditor was bound, in equity as well
as at law, to accept Treasury notes and
discharge his mortgage.
The constitutionality of the act was
likewise affirmed by the Supreme Court
of California in the case of Lick vs.
Faulkner, decided at the July Term,
1864,-the court locating the authority
among the implied powers of the General Government, and regarding it as
incidental to the express powers to
raise armies, to defend against invasions, and to suppress insurrections
The court did not
and rebellions.
deny, however, that the power might
be deduced (as it was by the Court of
Appeals of New York) from the specific
power to borrow money, but preferred
the view above indicated. We have read
the opinion of Mr. Justice CuRx. with
much satisfaction, and only regret that
our space will not permit us to publish it.
In Reynolds vs. The State Bank, 1
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 669, the Supreme
Court of Indiana, doubting if not denying the constitutional power of Congress to annex the legal tender clause,
nevertheless decided that they would
sustain the law until the Federal courts
should determine otherwise. But in
Thayer vs. Hedges, May Term, 1864
(judging from the abstract of Judge
REDFIELD, Am. Law Reg., January,
1865, p. 163, note to Warten vs. Paul),
this court seem to have denied the
power of Congress to declare paper or
Treasury notes a legal tender.
No court of the highest resort in any
state (unless in the case last mentioned) has yet pronounced against the
validity of the Act of Congress in the
particulars under consideration. The
decisions have uniformly sustained it.

Still, the question cannot be considered as definitely and authoritatively
settled until it shall have been decided
by the ultimate arbiter of all such questions-the Supreme Court of the United
States.
This high tribunal, it cannot be
doubted, will decide it wisely and well.
Precedent there is none. Narrow rules
and technical constructions have here
no place. Such a question demands
wise and enlarged statesmanship, as
well as, if not more than, mere judicial
learning.
The author of that act, or of the
policy which it embodies, is now the
Chief Justice of the court, and understands the question in all of its relations and bearings. After the lapse of
three years, it is perhaps not premature
to apply to him, in view of the wondrous results which this policy has
achieved, the splendid eulogium of
upon the genius and labors
WEBST
of ALEXANDER HAILTON :-" He smote
the rock of the National Resources, and
abundant streams of revenue gushed
forth. He touched the dead corpse of
the Public Credit, and it rose upon its
fee t !"
And any court with a just sense of
its duty and responsibility, will hesitate long, and distrust its own -wisdom
much, before it deliberately overthrows
an act founded in imperative necessity,
which has worked so well, and which
cannot be overthrown without entailing
general disaster and-universal financial
ruin alike upon Government and People.
Further, as bearing upon the question:-REnirsxan's valuable note to
Warren vs. Paul, ubi supra; Wood vs.
Bullens, 6 Allen (Mass.) 516; Schollenberger vs. Brinton, 3 Am. Law teg.
N. S. 591; Schoenberger vs. Watts, 1
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 553, referred to
infra; Bank of Commerce vs. N. Y.
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City, 2 Black 620 (1862),-reversing s.
c., 26 N. Y. 163,-in .which it was held
by the Supreme Court of the United
States, that a state tax upon stock issued under the same Act of Congress
(February 25, 1862) was a restriction
upon the constitutional power of the
General Government to borrow money,
and was therefore invalid. And see
further on this point, People vs. Bank
of Commonwealth, 23 N. Y. 192; s. o.,
1 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 81; People vs.
Commissioners, 2 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
and note of Prof. DwIGHT, and 3 Id.
535 and note.
II. At the same term at which the
Supreme Court of California decided
the case of Lick vs. Faulkner, szupra,
sustaining the validity of Treasury
notes as a legal tender, they also decided the case of Carpenter vs. Atherton, above given. We are indebted to
the courtesy of the judges, and to a
member of the bar, for a copy, and
gladly publish it, being a case of the
first impression and involving important principles.
The opinion of Mr. Justice CunEy
was concurred in by the four judges
taking part in the decision. Mr. Justice SAWYEiRdelivered a separate concurring opinion. Mr. Chief Justice
SADExnsoN declined to express a judicial opinion, having been a member of
the legislature which passed the act, if
not the author of it.
The reasons in favor of the view
taken are very forcibly stated in the
opinion, and it has received the high
sanction of Judge REDFIELD. (Note to
Warren vs. Paul, aupra.)
Still, it seems to the writer difficult
-he does not venture to say impossible-to reconcile these two decisions,
the one sustaining the validity of the
Act of Congress which declares that
Treasury notes are a legal tender for
all private debts, the other the validity
ofthe specific contract law of the state
which declares that for certain private

debts these notes are not a legal tender.
Gold is probably to a large extent the
circulating medium in that state. There
is a great difference in the market between the value of a dollar in coin and
a dollar in Treasury notes. If coin
was loaned, or a transaction based upon
gold, it was uncertain, prior to this decision, whether the creditor might not
legally be compelled to receive in payment Treasury notes. This uncertainty.
would doubtless tie up much capital
and create much embarrassment. And
if it can be done safely and consistently, we should be glad to approve a
course of decision which harmonizes
the interests of the state and those of
the United States.
The writer only intends to say that
he entertains grave doubts whether the
Act of Congress as it is now framed,
and the specific contract law in the
broad and general terms in which it is
couched, can both stand.
It seems quite clear that the decision
in Carpenter vs. Atherton conflicts with
the reasoning and principles laid down
in other well-considered cases.
Some of these we briefly notice, as
illustrating the general subject:Thus, in Shoenberger vs. Watts, decided by the District Court for the city
and county of Philadelphia, reported
in I Am. Law Reg. N. S. 553, the defendants, some years prior to the passage of the Act ctf Congress authorizing
the issue of Treasury notes, executed a
bond to the plaintiff, conditioned for
the payment of $28,000 "in specie,
current gold and silver money of the
United States."
The bond also provided "that no existing law or laws,
and no laws which may be hereafter enacted, shall operate, or be construed as
operating, to allow payment to be made
in any other money than that above designated ;" "the said obligors expressly
waiving the benefit derived or to be derived from such law or laws." Judgment was entered on this bond and ex-
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the delivery of grain, but the judgment
on it is not on that account for grain,
but for as much money as the grain
was worth. So, a judgment on a contract for doubloons would be not for.
doubloons but for their value.
In Wood vs. Bullens, 6 Allen (Mass.)
516, it was decided that the plaintiff in
an action on a promissory note payable
in specie, can only recover judgment for
the amount of the face of the note and
The able opinion of Judge Hna, in interest thereon, although he offers to
this case, assumes the validity of the prove that at the time when payment
Act of Congress, making Treasury of the note was demanded, specie was
notes a legal tender. His argument worth a premium above par. And note
reasoning of the court, and see similar
may be thus condensed:1. Congress has the power "to coin case of Warnebold vs. Schlicting, 16
money and regulate the value thereof" Iowa, and the elaborate opinion of
-to say what shall be money, and the WRIGHT, C. J.
Mr. Justice Aoaxw, of the Supreme
rate at which it shall be taken. This
is an attribute of sovereignty. Con- Court of Pennsylvania, decided in
gress has exercised this power. It has Schollenberger vs. Brinton, that where
declared that a dollar in Treasury notes ground-rent was payable in "lawful
is legally equivalent to a dollar in gold. silver money of the United States," it
The law does not discriminate between might, like other debts, be discharged
them as respects the payment of pri- in legal tender notes: 3 Am. Law Reg.
vate debts; and he is of the opinion N. S. 591. This case, however, is now
that it is not "competent for the citizen before the same court in Bane, and
to discriminate in a matter where the chiefly involves the preliminary queslaw of the land has refused to distin- tion whether or not the principal of a
guish, to make a bargain, excluding grpund-rent is a debt.
"A Treasury note," says Mr. Justice
those with whom he contracts from a
means of payment which the law has WRIGHT in Meyer vs. Roosevelt, supra,
decided shall be open to and available "of the denomination of ten dollars, is
for all, and encumber them with a debt legally as valuable as a coined eagle."
Without the aid of a specific contract
of anew and special nature, not capable
law
these'cases seem to establish that a
of being discharged in the way in which
party cannot by private contract make
ordinary debts are by law payable."
2. In relation to the provision in the a difference between coin and tender
bond waiving the benefit of future laws notes. A debt payable in one may be
allowing payment in anything but gold discharged in the other. If this is so,
and silver, the court argued that par- and if this results from the paramount
ties cannot, by private contract or sti- authority and effect of the law of Conpulation, dispense with, renounce the gress, the question is, can a state legisbenefit of, or eontrol laws founded upon ture authorize a different result?
And this presents two kindred conpublic policy, and in which the whole
siderations: 1st. Whether the letter as
community is interdsted.
3. The invariable course is to render well as the policy of the Act of Conjudgments for so many dollars lawful gress is not violated by allowing parties
money. Thus, a contract may be for to discriminate between that which the
ecution issued, in which the sheriff was
required to levy the debt and interest,
following the language of the bond,
"in specie, current gold and silver
money." The execution was set aside,
on motion, as irregular, the court holding that a final judgment at law is necessarily for lawful money, and that the
debtor had the legal right to pay it in
any money which the law has made a
legal tender.
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law has declared to be legally identical,
so far as the payment of private debts
is concerned; and, 2d. Whether it is
competent for the debtor, if such a
public policy does exist, to control the
same by private contract? That it is
not, see the cases above cited, and particularly Warnebold vs. Schlicting, 16
Iowa; Shoenberger vs. Watts, supra;
Kneetle vs. Newcomb, 22 N. Y. (8
Smith) 249, and the very interesting
opinign of DENiO, 3.
This distinguished judge there says:
"I do not think it is within the power
of parties, by their contracts, to give
any other effect to judgments and executions than that which'the law attributes to them. Could a person when
contracting a debt, agree, for instance,
that the act abolishing imprisonment
for debt should not apply to any judgment which might be recovered on that
contract; or that on such judgment
there should be no right in the debtor
to redeem any land that might be sold
on execution, or that he should not be
discharged under any insolvent act?
Clearly, this could not be done; and
upon the same principle, I think, the
debtor could not, when contracting the
debt, agree that exempt household property might be taken on the execution.
The law does not permit its process to
be used to accomplish ends which its
policy forbids, though the parties may,
by prospective contract, agree to such
use." And see, to same effect, Levicks
.vs. Walker, 9 Am. Law Reg. 112, but
compare with 31 Pa. St. Rep. 225; 24
Id. 426; 23 Id. 93, 94; 6 Watts 40.
After all, the subject is one of great
intrinsic difficulty. It is easy to put
cases, not unlikely to arise, where the
doctrine that coin and Treasury notes
are for all purposes legally identical, and
that a judgment can only be for so
many dollars payable in whatever the
law has made a legal tender, at the option of the debtor, would work positive

injustice where there exists a great difference in their market value. Suppose I leave $1000 in gold coin on special deposit, and my bailee converts it.
Again; suppose I loan $1000 in gold,
and the borrower agrees to return it in
kind the next day, or the next month.
Now, in either case (and others might
be put), a judgment for $1000, which
might be and which it is morally certain would be paid in tender-notes,
would work a manifest wrong, and one
from which there is no escape, unless
1st. It affords ground for relief in
equity; or, 2d. Unless statutes like the
one in California are valid. On the
other hand, suppose I loan $1000 in
tender-notes and receive the borrower's
note for $1000 in gold, would the courts
of California enforce this under the
broad language of their specific contract
law? Would it be usurious? Would
there be a partial want of consideration ? If such a note could be enforced
in full and in gold, the present market
difference continuing to the maturity
of the note, this would be as unjust as
in the cases above supposed.
Still, if California may pass such a
law, so may evei-y other state. And
when we consider the power of capital,
the power of the creditor, that he, as
between him and the debtor, is essentially "master of the situation," we
cannot resist the apprehension that the
practical effect of the general adoption
of such laws and of sustaining them,
will be to discredit the National currency and to clothe the lender and creditor with a new and formidable power
over the borrower and debtor. Equitable cases, like those above specified,
should be excepted from the legal tender clause. To avoid conflict, the
remedy should come from Congress
rather than the states. This suggestion is perhaps worthy of the attention
of the National Legislature.
J. F. D.
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Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
1
THE ERIE RAILWAY COMPANY vs. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.

A law, for revenue, laying a distinctive tax on the business of foreign corpo-"
rations habitually doing business in this state-such business consisting of the
transportation of goods, in transitu, from state to state, and the tax being graduated by the weight of the goods and the number of the passengers carried-is
an infringement of the clause of the Constitution of the United States giving to
Congress the regulation of commerce between the several states.
Such tax, though in form on the business of the companies, is, in substalce, a
tax on the commodities, the transportation of which constitutes such business.
Whenever the taxation of a commodity would amount to a regulation of commerce within the prohibition of the constitution, so will the taxation of an
inseparable incident, or necessary concomitant of such commodity.
A state cannot tax a foreign corporation on a principle different from that in
which she can tax one of her domestic corporations.
The power to refuse a recognition of corporate existence does not involve the
right to tax a foreign corporation at the arbitrary discretion of the government
possessing such power.
The act of taxation is a recognition of the legal status of the corporation
taxed, and admits that such corporation is clothed with all the rights necessary
to defend itself against illegal taxation.

The Supreme Court having, at February Term, 1864, decided
the statute in controversy in this cause to be constitutional and
valid, the Erie Railway Company, the defendants below, brought
their writ of error in this court.
The cause was argued by
I. W. Scudder, Depue, and Sipman, of New Jersey, and -D.
B. Eaton, of New York, for the plaintiffs in error; and by
F. T. Frelinghuysen, Attorney-General, for the defendant in
error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BEASLEY, C. J.-The important question to be decided in this
case arises out of the provision of the tenth section of the Act
of the Legislature of this state, relating to taxes, passed in the
year 1862.
As much of the section as is thus drawn in question, is in the
words following, viz. :That all corporations regularly doing
I We are indebted for this case to the kindness of J. P. Vroom, Esq., the Reporter.
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business in this state, and not being corporations of this state,
shall be assessed and taxed for, and in respect of, the business so
by them done and transacted in this state, in manner following,
that is to say- every such company so doing business, shall pay
a transit duty of three cents on every passenger, and two cents
on every ton of goods, wares, and merchandise, or other articles
carried or transported by or for such company, on any railroad
or canal in this state, for any distance exceeding ten miles, except passengers and freight transported exclusively within this
state; .

. .

. and such transit duty for railroad or canal trans-

portation shall be paid to the treasurer of this state, within the
mouth of January in each year, for the transportation of the previous year; and it shall be the duty of the president or treasurer
of every such company to furnish to the treasurer of the state,
by or bdfore the third'Tuesday of January, annually, under oath
or affirmation, a full and true account of the number of passengers, and of the number of tons of goods, wares, and merchandise, and other articles so carried or transported as aforesaid."
It is sufficient for all the purposes of the following discussion,
to state, generally, that the plaintiffs in error are a corporation
created by the laws of New York, and that the business which
they habitually do in this state, and which is liable to the tax in
dispute, is thus described in the state of the case agreed upon by
the parties: .

. .

. cM
Most of the goods, wares, merchandise, and

passengers, for the transportation of which, by the Erie Railway
Company, in the state of New Jersey, the said transit duty or
tax is charged, have been, by that company and other railroads
in connection with them, carried over the state of New Jersey,
from states and territories of the United States in the West, to
states of the United States in the East, and from states of-the
United States in the East, over New Jersey, to states and territories of the United States in the West. Some few goods, wares,
merchandise, and passengers have been transported from states
and territories beyond the limits of the state of New Jersey,
which transportation in New Jersey has exceeded ten miles."
From this statement of facts, it appears that the plaintiffs are
a foreign corporation, habitually transporting passengers and
commodities, in the course of commerce, between the states, over
the territory of New Jersey-and t6at the tax in question falls
on this business in proportion to the number of passengers and
the weight of the commodities transported.
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That the state of New Jersey, in the plenitude of her original
sovereignty as an independent government, had the right to impose the tax on the business in question, no one can dispute. Did
she relinquish such power in the formation of the General Government ? This inquiry obviously draws into the discussion
that provision of the Constitution of the United States which
declares that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several states.
The precise question, then, to be considered and decided is,
has the tax, which has given rise to this controversy, been laid,
within the meaning of the prohibitory clause just referred to,
upon commerce between the states ?
The principal argument urged before this 'Court, in support of
the negative of the foregoing proposition, was that this law did
not impose the duty on'the goods but on the business of the
plaintiffs in error, and on this account was not within the constitutional prohibition.
It certainly is not to be denied that a state has the right to
lay taxes which may incidentally affect commerce between the
states. Indeed, it is, perhaps, impossible to imagine any tax
which, in theory at least, may not be said to have, in the, distance,
such effect. That this class of taxes is legal, upon both general
and constitutional considerations, no one doubts. But the difficulty always has been, and probably ever will be, to determine with precision, when any given tax which has a tendency
to affect a subject having immunity is, within the purview of the
constitution, incidental and when direct. And this is the real
difficulty now to be overcome by this court.
The first observation that naturally occurs is, that the tax imposed must, to avoid the taint of unconstitutionality, be indirect
in substance, and not merely so in form. Can it be said that
this is so in the present case ? This tax falls on inter-state commerce alone. It reaches no further. The burthen is not on a
general business, one branch of which is the transportation of
extra-territorial goods. On the contrary, the only business of
the plaintiffs in error which is not taxed, is the business of such
company done entirely in the state of New Jersey, and which
does not consist of the transportation of merchandise from state
to state. The law discriminates and selects the transportation
of commodities passing from state to state as the peculiar objects
of the duty. It is also laid upon an employment in which the
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citizens of the state imposing it, have no concern; it can, therefore, be increased to any extent without in the least degree affecting their interests. This tax, consequently, cannot be said to
fall incidentally on the prohibited subject on account of its being
a general burthen on multiform matters, of which the conveyance
of articles of traffic in their passage from one state to another
happens to be one.
But this tax is not only thus specific and restrained to this one
class of objects, but it is also graduated by the weight of the
things carried. The business is charged a certain sum for the
transportation of every ton of goods. The tax, therefore, is
regulated, both as to its object and amount, by the articles transported. Now, it is impossible not to perceive that the effect of
such a tax must be, so far as respects the owner of such articles,
precisely, and in all its results, the same as thbugh the commodities themselves were directly taxed. The expense of the conveyance of such commodities from the place of production to the
market, is as much an element entering into their saleable value
as id the cost of their production. If a distinctive tax were
placed upon all persons employed in manufactories, in proportion
to the weight or value of the wares manufactured, no one would
doubt that such tax would fall upon such wares, and would be
ultimately paid by the consumer. So, when this tax is laid on
the transportation of the merchandise there is no more room for
doubt that, by the operation of well-known laws, it must pass
from the carrier to the things carried, and, in the precise ratio
of the statutory burthen, enhance their price in the market. The
consumer must pay the custom,'whether it be placed on the goods
or upon their transportation. The result, then, is that this imposition on the business of transportation, which it is argued is constitutional, produces the same effect, neither more nor less, upon
the private business of the owner of the goods as would be produced by a direct tax on the goods themselves, which latter form
of taxation would be undeniably unconstitutional. This substantial identity in the results would seem to favor strongly an inference of the substantial identity in the causes producing them.
The conclusion from this course of reasoning therefore is, that
if the transportation of merchandise, in transitu, from state to
state, can be taxed by a state in the form of the law now before
this court, the constitutional provision under consideration affords
VOL. XIII.-16
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no protection -whatever to the owner of the goods which are the
subjects of such transportation.
Nor does this matter, if we view it in its political effects,
assume a more favorable aspect. The right to place this duty on
this business of the plaintiffs in error, would be equivalent, considered as a prerogative of state government, to the right to tax
the commodities themselves. The political power and the political results would be in both cases identical. The exercise of the
right to tax in either of these two modes, would produce the
same disorder in the general system of domestic commerce, and
the same antagonism between the governments of the respective
states. The origin of the constitutional restriction on the autho
rity of the states with regard to this species of taxation, is not
involved in obscurity. It is known to all that it was the creature
of a disastrous experience. The evils which are inseparable from
the possession of the power by the several states to impose burthens on goods passing in the course of trade over their respective territories, had been exhibited during the existence of the
Articles of Confederation, in results too portentous to be easily
" The interfering and unneighborly regulations of
forgotten.
some states contrary to the true spirit of the Union," says Mr.
Hamilton, in the Federalist (Number XXII.), " have in different
instances given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others ;
and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not
restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and
extended till they became not less serious causes of animosity
and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse between
The commerce of- the
the different parts of the confederacy.
from the multiplicity
trammels
German Empire is in continual
of duties which the several princes and states exact upon the
merchandise passing through their territories, by means of which
the fine streams and navigable rivers with which Germany is so
Though the
happily watered, are rendered almost useless!
genius of the people of this country might never permit this description to be strictly applicable to us, yet we may reasonably
expect, from the gradual conflicts of state regulations, that the
citizens of each would at length come to be considered and treated
by the others in no better light than that of foreigners and aliens.''
Such had been the scene of the past, and such was the antil,pated future of this country, as drawn by the hand of a master,
if each state were permitted to retain that right which belonged.
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to sovereignty, of prescribing the terms on which the merchandise of other states might pass over her soil. And yet it would
seem that all considerate persons must admit that the power now
claimed will occasion, if exercised to any considerable extent, all
those effects so much deprecated, and which, in our early career
as a people, menaced so seriously the amity and unity of the confederacy. If a state, whose geographical position is upon any
of the great harbors along the seaboard, can by right of its sovereignty lay burthens upon the business of transporting over its
territory merchandise on its way to other states, must it not be
universally conceded that the restriction in the constitution, now
under review, is, considered as a political safeguard, fatally inefficient? It is to be remembered that this law attempts to raise
revenue from the business of non-residents. The parties taxed
are not the constituents of those who enact the law, and the consequence is, they do not possess any of that political influence
which, under ordinary circumstances, is the sure means of protection against oppressive legislation. Can any one doubt that
an example of this kind of irresponsible taxation will find a host
of ready imitators ? Or if the example should not be multiplied
from imitation, would it not be inevitably reproduced for the purpose of retaliation? Perhaps it is not too much to say, that a
tax equal to the one now in question, which should be imposed
on the transportation of this same merchandise in each of the
states through which it is carried before it reaches our confines,
would render the greater part of such merchandise unsaleable at
the place of its destination, except at a loss to its owner. We
cannot suppose that any-state would acquiesce in such a condition
of affairs; it could not stand by and see its citizens thus despoiled
and its commerce in fetters. It would act, and then would ensue
that petty conflict of rival interests which, at an epoch in the
past already noticed, derogated from the character and endangered the peace of our country.
Nor would the evil consequences of this state prerogative,
which is now claimed, stop even here. Thus far it has been seen
that its effect would be to disturb the constitutional equilibrium
of the states. But it would do more than this; it would affect
in a very material point the relation of the states to the central
government. By the fifth clause of the ninth section of article
first of the Constitution of the UniteeI States, it is provided,
" that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any
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state." This is a restriction on the power of the General Government, and its obvious purpose was to guard against the application of the taxing power for the regulation of commerce in
favor of one state to the injury of the interests of another. None
will deny that this cautionary provision is vastly important to
each several state of this Union. But if the doctrine that the
taxation of the business of transportation is not, in legal effect,
equivalent to the taxation of the merchandise so transported, is
to prevail, what will be the worth of this circumscription of the
Federal- authority ? The General Government has the same
right as that possessed by each state, to tai the business or occupations of individuals, and can, therefore, burden with tax concurrently with the local governments the employment of transportation. It would follow then, as an inevitable consequence,
that if the law in question is sustainable, so would be a law of
Congress placing a tax on the business of transporting through
Pennsylvania all merchandise passing as exports through that
state from New Jersey, or elsewhere; and it needs no argument
to demonstrate that a tax of this nature could be imposed in such
form, and under such conditions, as to prevent anything like profitable exportation. Would any state thus disabled be satisfied
with the argument that the tax was not upon the export, but was
upon the business of transporting such export ? It is believed
that such a burthen laid on the commerce of a state would be
universally censured, not only as an act of injustice but as a
palpable infringement of the constitutional provision just quoted,
and yet the imposition of such a burthen would appear to be
justified by the principle which alone can sustain the state law
now in controversy.
The result of this reasoning is, that a recognition of the power
claimed would not only affect disastrously the harmonious intercourse of the states with each other, but would also subject each
of the several states to the liability of the exercise of a highly
dangerous power on the part of the General Government.
A construction which would thus frustrate the operation of the
Federal Constitution in two respects, each of which is of great
political importance, could not in my opinion be justified, except
upon the ground that the language of the instrument is so clear
upon the subject, that it manifests that these results, so obvious
and so hurtful, did not fall within the contemplation of the
framers of the constitution, and consequently were not provided
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against. When an opposite result would be so injurious, it is a
relief to conclude that such clear language, evincive of such oversight, does not exist. Interpreting the words of the constitution
in the light of the evident purpose of those who employed them,
it does not seem to me that the point in question is left in any
obschrity. The object was to pass articles of traffic from one
point in this country to another, through intervening states, free
of import or duty by such states. The goods, the transportation
of which is taxed under the present law, are such articles; nor
has it been denied that such goods, while being thus transported,
constitute a part of the commerce between the states. But it
seems to have been overlooked that the transportation is as much
a part of such commerce as the goods themselves are. If there
can be no commerce between the states without goods, so there
can be none without the transportation of the, goods. The two
must be united to constitute inter-state commerce. Is it not certain, then, that a duty on one of these two elements in commerce
must, in the nature of things, operate as a tax upon the other?
As commerce, the two things arc indissoluble; are they divisible
for the purpose of taxation ? I think it may be laid down as a
general rule, universally applicable to all cases arising under the
clause of the constitution now considered, that whenever the taxation of a commodity would amount to a regulation of commerce,
so will the taxation of an inseparable incident, or a necessary
concomitant of such commodity. The object being to protect the
merchandise from all exactions in its transit over a state, by a
rule of cbnstruction as necessary as it is elementary, we must
imply a protection to the means required to effect such passage,
because without such implication the privilege intended to be
secured is defeated.
It was upon this doctrine that the case of Brown vs. Maryland,
12 Wheat. 419, was decided. The facts were these. A state
law required an importer to pay for and take out a license, as a
prerequisite to a right to sell imported goods-and the court
ruled that this requisition was in conflict with the provision of
the Constitution of the United States which prohibits a state from
laying any import or duty on exports or imports. The argument
in support of the law was, that the tax was not on the article
imported, but that it was a tax upon the privilege of the owner
to sell the article after importation. It was said the state might
lawfully tax occupations, and that this law did nothing more.
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But Chief Justice

MARSHALL

refuted the argument in the follow-

ing clear and emphatic sentences :-" It is impossible," he says,
" to conceal from ourselves that this is varying the form without
varying the substance.
It is treating a prohibition which is
general as if it were confined to a particular mode of doing the
forbidden thing. All must perceive that a tax on the sale of an
article, imported only for sale, is a tax upon the article itself.
It is true, the state may tax occupations generally, but this tax
must be paid by those who employ the individual, or it is a tax
on his business. The lawyer, the physician, or the mechanic,
must either charge more on the article in which he deals, or the
thing itself is taxed through his person. This the state has a
right to do, because no constitutional prohibition extends to it.
So a tax on the occupation of the importer is in like manner a
tax on importation. It must add to the price of the article, and
be paid by the consumer, or by the importer himself, in like
manner as a direct duty on the article itself would be made.
This the state has not a right to do, because it is prohibited by
the constitution."
This reasoning, the strength and justness of which it is impossible to resist, appears to be entirely applicable to the case now
before this court; for, surely, not more essential is the power to
sell the imported article than is the power to transport the article
to its market. In the reported case the court also held that the
tax upon the sale of the imported article was likewise repugnant
to the clause of the constitution which empowers Congress to
regulate commerce among the several states, the argunient being
that commerce is intercourse; that importation, and the right to
sell the thing so imported, were each an essential ingredient of
such intercourse, and that consequently a restriction on the power
to sell such importation was, in the nature of things, a regulation
of commerce.
The case of Almy vs. The People of California, 24 How. 169,
rests upon analogous principles. The question was whether a
stamp duty on bills of lading, for gold or silver, transported to
any part or place out of the state, was a tax on'exports. The
court held the affirmative, and declared the act unconstitutional.
Chief Justice TANEY, in delivering the opinion of the court, thus
expresses his views :But a tax or duty on a bill of lading,
although differing in form from a duty on the article shipped, is
in substance the same thing, for a bill of lading, or some written
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instrument of the same import, is necessarily always associated
with every shipment of articles of commerce from the ports of
one country to those of another. The necessities of commerce
require it .....
.A bill of lading, therefore, or some equivalent
instrument of writing is invariably associated with every cargo
of merchandise exported to a foreign country, and consequently
a duty upon that is, in substance and effect, a duty on the article
imported."
As a bill of lading is not, in any point of view, as necessary
to an export as transportation is to an article of inter-state commerce, it would seem self-evident, on the assumption of the correctness of this decision, that the taxation of such transportation
must of necessity be a regulation of commerce within the prohibitory clause 'of the constitution. It is conceived that both
these cases, so far as relates to the principle upon which the case
now before this court is to be decided, are directly in point, and
as adjudications of the court of the last resort, of course their
authority, is decisive.
It has been already observed that the tax in hand is specific,
that is, it affects but a single interest, viz., the transportation of
goods in the course of traffic from one part of the country to the
other. This singleness in the object taxed must necessarily, as
it would seem, make the tax a regulation of commerce. No other
doctrine is practicable-because the right to tax in such form is
an acknowledgment of the right to prohibit. Yielding to prexaises, the conclusion is unavoidable. The amount of the tax
cannot affect its legality; if the present duty, which it is presumed the business of the plaintiffs can easily bear, is legal, so
also would be a duty under which such business must necessarily
languish and die. In other words, the nature of this species of
taxation is such that a mere increase of sufficient magnitude of
the duty in question would put an end to the business of interstate commerce, so far as the same is carried on by foreign corporations over the soil of this state. Nor is it perceived that there
is anything in principle which would prevent an indefinite extension of such taxation. If the employment of these plaintiffs can
be thus trammelled, why not impose the burthen on the entire
business of transporting merchandise from other states over the
soil of this state ? It is not forgotten that it was pressed by
counsel on the argument in defence of this law, that as at present
framed it applies solely to the business of corporations created

-
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by the laws of other states.

Viewed in a merely practical light,

this consideration is not of much weight, for it is evident that
almost all the commerce between the states must always be in
the hands of corporations of this description, and that, consequently, the power to tax to the point of prohibition the business
of such companies is, substantially, the power to interdict the
entire commerce. But, considering the question in a theoretical
point of view, it would seem to be clear that a state cannot tax
for the purpose of revenue, a foreign corporation in a mode different in principle from that in which she can tax one of her own
domestic corporations. It is not denied that the corporate existence of a company is recognised, not by right, but of grace, in
foreign jurisdictions, nor that each government has the competence to refuse to recognise such existence, except on its own
conditions.
The principle is universally acknowledged. Hence
laws requiring insurance companies and other foreign corporations to file bonds and submit to other exactions, as a prerequisite
to their admission in an incorporated capacity into the state. Such
laws, when rightfully made, are evidently mere police regulations,
designed to protect the citizens of the state in which they are
enacted from loss or imposition, and on this ground their legality
cannot be drawn in question. But a tax-law having revenue for
its object, is based upon a principle entirely different. The right
to tax for revenue is the right of the government to take so much
of the property of the person or company upon whom the tax
falls as such government may deem necessary for its public wants.
The act of taking the property, therefore, must of necessity be
an acknowledgment of the legal status of the person or company
whose property is taken. To assert that the company whose property is thus taken has no rights but such as the government
taking it chooses to confer, is to assert that such company has
no title to its property but such as may be conceded to it by the
taking power. It seems to be utterly inconsistent with legal
principles which have always been deemed axiomatic, to hold
that a government can recognise the legal existence of a foreign
corporation for the purpose of taxation, and at the same time can
deny such legal existence for the purpose of depriving it of those
rights which belong to every individual or company known to the
law. Such a doctrine would, obviously, offer the entire property
of foreign corporations as a prize to the rapacity of any state in
whose territories it might be, or over which it might happen to
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be carried. It is readily to be admitted that a law imposing certain terms upon all foreign corporations as conditions precedent
to their acquisition in this state of the right to act in the unity
of their corporate existence, would be legal. Such law would
prevent foreign persons from doing any legal act in this state as
a corporation, but can it be maintained that such law would have
the further effect of leaving the property of the company as the
spoil of the first taker? A statute that should abolish the rule
of comity, and should refuse a recognition of foreign corporations, would, it is conceived, have this effect, and no more, i. e.,
to convert the foreign corporators, as to the state enacting the
supposed law, into a partnership of individuals, and thus, although
the corporation as such could not by suit or otherwise assert its
right to protect its property, the members of the company would
be under no such disability. The opposite view would place the
larger part of the property of corporations, in whose possession
is accumulated so much of the wealth of the country, out of the
protection of those fundamental principles of law, without the
safeguard of which all property loses so much of its value. If a
state under a tax-law can require a foreign corporation to pay
any sum it may please, and then may defend itself against the
alleged unconstitutionality of such act on the plea that the company taxed has no rights but such as of grace may be conferred
upon it, no reason is perceived why the General Government could
not, at its pleasure, seize the property of all corporations in this
country, oil the ground that incorporated companies have no rights
which the law is bound to respect, or which are recognised by the
Constitution of the United States. A principle involving such
results is not admissible. The clause of the tax act in question,
in my view, cannot be defended on the fact that the parties taxed
are foreign corporations. The result, therefore, is, that if the
present statute can be sustained, a law taxing the entire business
of transporting inter-state commerce would be constitutionalthe inevitable corollary to that proposition being, that as the
power to tax transportation includes the power to destroy it, each
state holds the right to permit or to refuse passage over its soil
of goods carried in the course of trade from state to state. The
statement of the proposition leaves my mind free from all doubt
that the exercise by a state of a prerogative of this character,
either so far as to burden such transportation, or to prevent it
altogether, is a regulation of commerce which falls under the
prohibition of the Constitution of the United States.
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Upon the argument before this court it was rather suggested
than insisted on, that the authority conferred by the constitution
upon Congress to regulate commerce among the several states, is
not exclusive, but is concurrent with that of the states. The
court, in illustration, were referred to the laws passed by the
soveral states for the regulation of pilots and pilotage, and others
of a like character, the constitutionality of which is not now at
all questionable. But it is believed that since the decision of the
case of Cooley vs. Board of Warden8 of Port of Philadelphia,
12 How. 299, this question, so far as it relates to a case similar
to the one now before this court, is not open to discussion. Formerly, it must be confessed, the matter was perplexed to a great
degree by much contrariety of opinion among the several members of the Supreme Court of the United States, but the decision
referred to has placed the doctrine on more stable grounds. In
that case it was resolved, that although in matters of mere local
interest, such as a systeni of rules controlling pilotage in harbors,
the power of Congress was merely concurrent with that of the
states, nevertheless, whatever subjects of the power to regulate
commerce were in their nature national, or admitted of .only one
uniform plan of regulation, were of such a nature as to require
exclusive legislation by Congress. It is plain that this could not
be affirmed of laws for the regulation of pilots and pilotage-but
is it not equally plainly that it can be affirmed of the regulation
now in question before this court ? If the foregoing argument
has been successful, it has established the proposition that the
tax created by the law of this state is a taxation of inter-state
commerce, and, certainly, admitting that postulate, all must concede that it is in its nature national, and not local.
The result, then, to which my examination of this subject has
led me is, that the legislature of this state had not the constitutional power to lay the tax in question on the business of the
plaintiffs in error.
This conclusion has not been reached without the exercise of
that degree of reflection which the importance of the subject so
eminently demanded. Not the slightest doubt has been entertained that the law under review was enacted with the fairest
intention, and that its purpose was simply to subject foreign corporations doing business in this state to an equitable share of the
burden of maintaining that government which extended its protection to them, as well as over the business of its own citizens.

